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Abstract
This article starts by looking at Article 86 of the ECC Treaty governing antitrust violations
and the significance of “dominant position” in applying the Rule. The author then explains how
in light of United Brands v. Commission, a Court of Justice of the European Communities Court,
evidence of dominance may be classified in four categories. Next, the author explains the different
types of abuses under Article 86. Finally, the author draws four conclusions. First, the contrast
drawn by various authors between the EEC law, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position,
and U.S. law, which forbids ”monopolisation”, is exaggerated and inaccurate. Second, all the
U.S. case law on monopolising and attempts to monopolise under section 2 of the Sherman Act
is relevant to EEC law. Third, the valuable economic analyses of U.S. antitrust cases and policies
is directly relevant and valuable in considering Community antitrust policy and experience, and
this should encourage more comparative and economic analysis of European Community antitrust
law. Fourth, if ”monopolising” by a dominant enterprise is prohibited by Article 86, complaints
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I. A DOMINANT POSITION
The relevant provision of the EEC Treaty governing antitrust
violations' (Treaty) can be found in Article 86.2 Under Article 86,
* Legal Adviser, Legal Service, Commission of the European Communities,
Brussels. The speech on which this article is based will appear in 1978 FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (B. Hawk ed. 1979). This
article represents the author's personal opinion.
Advocate General Mayras said in 1972 that "it would be rash to make a system-
atic reapproachment between American law and Community law." ICI v. Commis-
sion, [1972] C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 670, [1971 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8161. A United States lawyer has written that "American legal precedents
are too loosely cited in EEC cases." Jones, Americah Anti-trust and EEC Competi-
tion Law in Comparative Perspective, 1974 L.Q. REV. 191. Nevertheless, it has been
thought useful in this article to cite a few United States cases and authors to
illustrate some of the similarities and differences between the two systems of law.
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. Article 86 reads as follows:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be af-
fected thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper advan-
tage of a dominant position within the Common Market or within a substan-
tial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market
and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or sell-
ing prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect
of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a
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major significance is given to the concept of a "dominant posi-
tion. 3
A dominant position is "a position of economic strength en-
joyed by the enterprise which enables it to prevent effective com-
petition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
petitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers."-4
party, of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1.
3. "Whether or not a position is dominant depends in each case upon the de-
limitation of the 'relevant market,' for an enterprise cannot have a 'dominant posi-
tion' in general, but always only in respect of certain products or services." C.
OBERDORFER, A. CLEISS & M. HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 206 at 73,
(CCH 1963). This article does not discuss the relevant market under Article 86.
The leading cases on the relevant market are: Continental Can v. Commission,
[1973] C.I. Comm. E. Rec. 215, at paras. 28-37, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171; and United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 207, at paras. 10-57, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. See also United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
On the aspects of Article 86 covered by this paper, see generally J. VAN DAMME,
REGULATING THE BEHAVIOUR OF MONOPOLIES AND DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS IN
COMMUNITY LAW (1977), especially the papers by Schroter on relevant market and
dominant position. This volume was, however, published before the United Brands
judgment of the Court. See also C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW
OF COMPETITION, 160-72, 184-85 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as C. BELLAMY &
G. CHILD].
4. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 65,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429 (emphasis added).
For earlier definitions of a "dominant position," see the Commission's Memorandum
on "Le problbme de la Concentration dans le Marchb Commun (1966)," [1976-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800, where it is said "[a] dominant po-
sition exists on a market when one or more enterprises have the power to adopt an
independent strategy influencing the decisions of other market participants so that
workable and sufficiently effective competition cannot appear and maintain itself on
the market." Id. The Commission's Memorandum also stated that market domination
cannot be defined solely in terms of the market share of an enterprise or of other
quantitative elements of a particular market structure. It is primarily a matter of eco-
nomic potency, or the ability to exert on the operation of the market an influence
that is substantial and also in principle foreseeable for the dominant enterprise. This
economic ability of a dominant enterprise influences the market behaviour and the
economic decisions of other enterprises, irrespective of whether it is used in a spe-
cific sense. If an enterprise is able, at its pleasure, to oust a competing enterprise
from the market, it might already occupy a dominant position and exert a controlling
influence upon the practises of other enterprises even if its own share of the market
is still relatively small. Id.
In Re United Brands, the Commission stated:
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to be-
have independently without taking into account, to any substantial extent,
their competitors, purchasers and suppliers. Such is the case where an un-
dertaking's market share, either in itself or when combined with its know-
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how, access to raw materials, capital or other major advantage such as trade-
mark ownership, enables it to determine the prices or to control the
production or distribution of a significant part of the relevant goods. It is not
necessary for the undertaking to have total dominance such as would de-
prive all other market participants of their commercial freedom, as long as it
is strong enough in general terms to devise its own strategy as it wishes,
even if there are differences in the extent to which it dominates individual
submarkets.
19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L95) 11 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9800.
In Re Continental Can, the Commission stated:
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to be-
have independently, which puts them in a position to act without taking into
account their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That is the position
when, because of their share of the market, or of their share of the market
combined with the availability of technical knowledge, raw materials or cap-
ital, they have the power to determine prices or to control production or dis-
tribution for a significant part of the products in question. This power does
not necessarily have to derive from an absolute domination permitting the
undertakings which hold it to eliminate all will on the part of their eco-
nomic partners, but it is enough that they be strong enough as a whole to
ensure to those undertakings an overall independence of behaviour, even if
there are differences in intensity in their influence on the different partial
markets.
• . . Continental Can's important shares in the market, its production pro-
gramme covering all the part markets and some substitution products, its
supply of machines for manufacturing and using its products, its technical
lead and its economic and financial power based on a very large size, ensure
for that undertaking possibilities of independent action which give it a very
strong position on the German market in light containers for meat and fish
preserves as well as in metal covers.
15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L7) 25 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9481.
See also the opinion of the Advocate General in Deutsche Grammaphon v.
Metro, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8106.
According to these criteria, the position of producers and distributors of sim-
ilar products must be taken into account and it must be asked whether the
undertaking which is alleged to occupy a dominant position has the neces-
sary power to impede effective competition in a considerable part of the rel-
evant market. Thus . . . it must be considered whether it is possible for an
undertaking, by virtue of its share of the market (including the shares of
other undertakings belonging to the same group), its know-how, its raw ma-
terials, its capital and its exclusive rights, to determine prices for a substan-
tial part of the common market (such as the territory of a Member State), or
to control production and distribution, and whether an undertaking has
scope for independent action and can act to a large extent without regard to
competitors or suppliers . .. it will be possible to hold that a dominant posi-
tion exists on the basis of such exclusive contracts in rare cases only, for ex-
ample, if the performers in question are unusually successful and numerous
exclusive contracts exist.
Id. at 511.
Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (ability to exclude competition is a sign of
monopoly power).
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Briefly then, a dominant position is economic power, due to
lack of competition, of which the holder can take advantage to
impede effective competition. An enterprise may have a dominant
position, even if effective competition has not been eliminated. 5
To determine whether a dominant position exists, all facts
tending to prove or disprove the market power of the enterprise
must be taken into account. The effect of a series of findings may
be cumulative, especially if only one enterprise on the market en-
joys all of the competitive advantages considered. No single fact is
necessarily decisive. 6
United Brands v. Commission7 is the leading case on the sub-
ject of dominance. United Brands, a New York corporation, is, at
present, the largest group on the world banana market and ac-
counted for 35% of world exports in 1974.8 On December 17,
1975, the Commission of the European Communities (Commission)
handed down a decision9 which declared that United Brands had
infringed Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (a) by requiring its dis-
tributor/ripeners "to refrain from selling its bananas while still
green";' 0 (b) by charging its distributor/ripeners in the various
Member States "dissimilar prices for equivalent transactions";'1 (c)
"by imposing unfair prices" for the sale of its bananas on its cus-
5. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 113,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429. In Suiker Unie et al.
v. Commission, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334 [hereinafter cited as the Sugar Cartel cases], the Court said
dominance is the power to impede the maintenance of effective competition. Id. at
paras. 381-82. It will be seen that in Community Law as in United States antitrust
law, "the material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not
that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists
to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so." American To-
bacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). In fact, it is characteristic of domi-
nant firms that they tolerate competitors as long as they do not compete too success-
fully or vigourously, but react strongly against a competitor which is noticeably
successful. This is relevant to anticompetitive and reprisal abuses. See notes 70-71
infra and accompanying text.
6. This is clear from the judgment in United Brands v. Commission [1978] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras. 63-129, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8429.
7. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
8. Id. at para. 97, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
9. Re United Brands, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L95) 11 (1976), [1976-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
10. Id. after para. 131, [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800.
11. Id., [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
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tomers; l2 and (d) by refusing to supply a major distributor/ripener
on the ground that it had taken part in an advertising campaign for
bananas of a competing brand.' 3 The Commission imposed a fine of
one million units of account and ordered United Brands to bring
the infringements to an end without delay. 14 United Brands ap-
pealed the decision to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (Court). The Court affirmed in part the decision of
the Commission except that it annulled finding (c) above, of the
Commission and reduced the fine to 850,000 units of account. 15 In
light of the Court's decision in United Brands, evidence of domi-
nance may be classified in four categories.
A. The Features of the Allegedly Dominant Enterprise
Characteristics of the enterprise itself may indicate that it has
market power sufficient to amount to dominance. In United Brands
the Court took into account the following characteristics of the
United Brands group: 16
1. United Brands was vertically integrated from its banana
plantations through to the point of sale to the consumers. 17
2. It had ample sources of supply for its needs from its own
plantations and through links with growers producing the variety of
bananas required by United Brands.' 8
3. It had a broad geographical spread of plantations giving it
protection against the effects of hurricanes and disease.19
4. It was relatively self-sufficient in transport.20
12. Id., [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
13. Id., [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
14. Id., [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
15. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 309,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
16. Id. at paras. 58-129, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
17. Id. at paras. 70-71, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. Through close supervision of ripening and of both its own retailers and those
of its customers, United Brands is vertically integrated from its sales to whole
ripener/distributors through to the point of sales. Id.
18. Id. at paras. 72-74, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
19. Id. at paras. 75-76, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
20. Id. at paras. 78-81, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. Thus allowing it to have more frequent deliveries in Europe than any of
its competitors.
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5. It had a greater scope of research than its competitors. 2
6. It had so stabilized the quality of its product that it ensured
regular customers and consolidated its economic strength. 22
7. Its limited number of customers simplified its supply policy
and provided economies of scale. 23
8. Its policy of delivering less than the quantities ordered
maintained its position of strength.2 4
The Court accepted the Commission's argument that, although
no one of these features alone would have been enough to show
dominance, the fact that United Brands was the only enterprise in
the market to have all these advantages showed that it was domi-
nant.2 5 How far features of these kind would give a competitive ad-
vantage will, of course, depend on the particular character of each
case. The characteristics of competitive advantages will differ from
industry to industry.2 6 Also, the changing market conditions within
a particular industry will alter the importance of certain features.2 7
B. Market Shares and Effectiveness of Competition
As to market shares in United Brands, the Court held that a
corporation with 40-45% of the relevant market 28 was not thereby
21. Id. at paras. 82-84, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. This has been proven by results: ". . . in this respect [its competitors] are at
a disadvantage compared to [United Brands]." Id. at para. 84.
22. Id. at paras. 85-94, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. General quality control of a homogeneous product makes the advertising of
the brand name effective and indeed makes it the "premier" brand name on the rel-
evant market. Id. at para. 87. "The distributor cannot afford not to offer it to the con-
sumer." Id. at para. 93. Through its policy of labelling in the tropics it had revolu-
tionized the banana trade.
23. Id. at para. 95, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
24. Id. at para. 96, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
25. Id. at para. 66, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
$ 8429.
26. Bananas are a relatively simple product and the effect of each feature was
fairly clear without elaboration. In a more complex industry, of course, the effect of
each feature could be considerably more difficult to ascertain.
27. For example, if production fluctuated, owning one's own ships might be a
costly handicap when production was low, especially if the ships were specialized or
for any reason could not easily be used for other purposes. If demand fluctuated, it
might be advantageous to be able to ensure maximum deliveries at times of high
prices.
28. The "relevant market" is the market for bananas in five of the nine Euro-
pean Community Member States.
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automatically proved to be dominant: among other things, the
strength and number of its competitors, and their market shares,
were also relevant. 29 United Brands had a market share several
times greater than that of its next largest competitor (who had
9%-16%), and in each national market it sold about twice as much
as the next supplier there. United Brands' market share included
sales which it made in Latin America to a major European
importer-distributor which cooperated with United Brands and
never competed with it in price or otherwise.
In Hoffmann-La Roche, 30 the Court said that though the sig-
nificance of even a large market share would vary with the circum-
stances of the market, very large market shares may prove domi-
nance unless there are exceptional circumstances .3  Again, the
relative sizes of the dominant firm's market share and those of its
next largest competitors were stressed. For vitamin A it had 47%
and its two main competitors 27% and 18%, for vitamin C it had
63-66% and its competitors 14% and 6%, and for vitamin E it had
50-64% and its competitors 16% and 6%; the Court said these fig-
ures proved dominance in each case. 32 The first of these three in-
stances is interesting because the dominant firm's market share was
little larger than that of United Brands' while those of its competi-
tors were much larger than those of the competitors of United
Brands.
The economic strength of United Brands, the Court stated,
had enabled it to adopt a flexible overall strategy against new com-
petitors establishing themselves on the whole of the relevant
market. 33 The financial and practical barriers to entry on the mar-
ket made effective competition impossible. 34 Active competition
29. "A trader can be in a dominant position on the market for a product
only if he has succeeded in winning a large part of this market.... This per-
centage does not . . . permit the conclusion that UBC automatically controls
the market. [The question of dominance] must be determined having regard
to the strength and number of the competitors."
United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras. 107, 109-10,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
30. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, [1979] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 461, 3
COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
31. Id. at para. 93, 3 Comm. MKT. L.R. 211.
32. Id. at paras. 106-08, 3 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
33. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 121,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
34. The Court referred to the need for large capital investment, diverse sources
of supply, efficient transport because of the product's perishability, economies of
scale not available to new market entrants, and the costs and risks of market entry
1979-19801
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against United Brands tended to be limited in space and time and
relatively ineffective.3 5 The Court also stressed that customers con-
tinued to buy more bananas from United Brands although its prices
were higher. 36
C. Performance
United Brands argued that it had made losses during the rele-
vant period and, since dominance is in essence the power to fix
prices, making losses is inconsistent with the existence of a domi-
nant position. The Court rejected this argument, saying that large
profits may be made in competitive conditions, and low profits or
even losses are compatible with dominance.3 7
High prices may be combined with modest profits, for exam-
ple, if the enterprise is using profits from one source to subsidise
sales of another product or in another market, or if it is ineffi-
cient, as monopolists may be, or if very heavy investment costs
are being incurred. Profits are not a conclusive test of domi-
nance.
Clearly, the fact that an enterprise has not charged high prices
is not proof that it is not dominant. It might have used its eco-
nomic power in some other way, or it might not have used it at all.
But prices which clearly could not have been charged, or profits
which could not have been made, in conditions of competition
would of course be evidence of dominance, at least in a well estab-
lished market.
D. Behaviour
The Court in United Brands stated that in determining
whether a dominant position exists "it may be advisable to take ac-
count if need be of the facts put forward as acts amounting to
(setting up adequate commercial network and large scale advertising). Id. at para.
122, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
35. Competitors which launched sales campaigns failed to reduce United
Brands' market share or substantially increase their own. United Brands nullified
their efforts by reducing its prices to meet competition or by bringing indirect pres-
sure on distributors. Id. at paras. 114-20, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8429.
36. The Court stated that this was "a particular feature of the dominant position
and its verification is determinative in this case." Id. at para. 128, [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at para. 126, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
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abuses without necessarily having to acknowledge that they are
abuses." 38 In other words, behaviour can be evidence of domi-
nance.
The Commission had argued that normally only an enterprise
with considerable market power could successfully prohibit its cus-
tomers from reselling its goods horizontally when they had a finan-
cial reason for doing so, or charge substantially different prices in
the same place and circumstances, or cut off supplies because a
customer had given a competitor publicity, all of which United
Brands had done. The Commission had not, however, relied
strongly on behavioural evidence of dominance either in its deci-
sion or in its written pleadings to the Court. This seems to be the
reason why the Court gave little attention to it; the quotation
above makes it clear that in appropriate cases the Court would ac-
cept such evidence.
A dominant position exists when the dominant enterprise is
able to use its economic power to obtain benefits or to practise be-
haviour which it could not obtain or practise in conditions of rea-
sonably effective competition, i.e., that dominant power is power
of which unfair advantage can be taken, or power which is great
enough to be "abused." This principle is one basis for behavioural
evidence of dominance in Community law, if one is needed.3 9 This
principle also implies a link between the concept of dominance and
38. Id. at para. 68, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. "[The] best and simplest evidence . . . that defendants have a requisite de-
gree of power over market price, or over competitors' entry, is its actual use." Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 48 (1955);
Judge Taft, in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) said, "The most cogent evidence that they have
this power is the fact . . . that they exercise it." 85 F. at 292. Judge Wyzanski, in
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd, 384 U.S. 563
(1966) stated, "Hardly any indicium of monopoly power is more persuasive than the
continued capacity of the asserted monopolistic combination to sustain offerings at
a loss either in particular areas or in particular services or products." 236 F. Supp.
at 254 (emphasis in original). Successfully imposing a "tie-in" in a number of cases
is proof of economic power over the tying product. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958). See also Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary An-
swer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375 (1974).
39. "It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking
has made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way
as to reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been normal
and sufficiently effective competition." United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 249, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMm. MKT. REP.
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the concept of abuse. For example, large financial resources would
be an important aspect of dominance if the abuse charged was un-
fairly low pricing.
Behavioural evidence of dominance may become important in
the future in appropriate cases, as well as the features of the alleg-
edly dominant firm and the extent of competition.
E. General Comment on the Concept of Dominant Position
The Court's definition of a dominant position in United
Brands, quoted above, implies two criteria:
1. The power to prevent "effective" competition being main-
tained (even if that power has not been exercised and so effective
competition has not been ended), i.e., power to exclude or seri-
ously weaken competitors, or to prevent new competitors from en-
tering the market, by raising barriers to entry.
2. The power to behave "to an appreciable extent" indepen-
dently of its competitors, customers and consumers.
The words in quotes imply differences in degree and not nec-
essarily differences in kind. The Court seems to regard these two
criteria as two aspects of the same threshold. A third
criterion-power to control prices-was referred to by the Com-
mission in its Continental Can decision, 40 from part of which the
Court's second criterion seems to have come. 41 This criterion can
be considered as one aspect of the power to behave independently
of others. These three criteria are all tests of the same threshold,
though in any given case it may be easier or more convincing to
use one rather than the others. 42
(CCH) 8429 (quoting EEC Commission Memorandum on Concentration, (1966)).
The Court's comment was made in discussing excessive prices, but appears to apply
equally to many other kinds of abuses.
40. Re Continental Can, 15 O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L7) 25 at paras. 100-02
(1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9481.
41. In United States antitrust law monopolization involves "power to control
prices or exclude competition." United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956). The tests used by the Court in United Brands were already well es-
tablished in Community law. Compare Schroter, Le concept de position dominante,
in J. VAN DAMME, supra note 3, and the authorities collected therein, with Article
66(7) European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957), which
speaks of enterprises holding "a dominant position shielding them from effective
competition;" and Article 85(3) EEC Treaty, supra note 1, which allows restrictive
agreements to be approved only if inter alia they do not "afford . . . [the
participating corporations] the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question."
42. "Preventing effective competition" suggests power to indulge successfully
[Vol. 3:1
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Power to control prices does not mean power to set prices at
any level: if it did, dominance would be. possible only in respect of
necessities for which the demand was totally inelastic. Power to set
prices at any level, regardless of consumer reaction, is not nor-
mally a feature of economic power, even power which would be
universally regarded as constituting dominance. In the United
Brands case the Court held that the ability continuously to charge
higher prices than competitors without loss of market share was "a
particular feature," i.e., a proof, of dominance, although it was
clear that United Brands could not have set its prices at any level
it liked. "Power to control prices" is therefore not a test which
implies a threshold higher than the two tests explicitly mentioned
by the Court in the United Brands case.
It is not power to eliminate competition which is the test of
dominance, it is the power to interfere with or eliminate ("to
impede the maintenance of") effective competition. This power
might exist even if the dominant firm was not able to eliminate all
competition. For dominance it is sufficient that one firm is able to
prevent competition continuing on an effective basis: that it is able,
as it were, to draw the teeth of its competitors, even if it has not in
fact done so.
The Court's view that the failure of competitors' sales cam-
paigns is evidence of dominance is important and perceptive. It is
the ability to contain competition, not the ability to ignore it,
which is characteristic of dominance. Dominant firms can overcome
competition, but very few of them can disregard it. The power to
plan and choose a controlled response to competitors' efforts, suffi-
cient to ensure no significant long term loss of market share, is
typical of dominant firms. As market leader a dominant firm is of-
ten able to adopt a strategy advantageous to itself and disadvanta-
geous for the rest of the industry, without using overtly exclusion-
ary practises, which will maintain its market in spite of some
competition. Such a strategy may be adopted on the dominant
firm's own initiative or in response to competitors' actions. Since
dominance does not mean absence of competition, or even absence
in exclusionary practises; "power to behave independently" suggests self-sufficiency
and ability to implement a freely chosen strategy, to be a market leader in matters
other than price (as United Brands undoubtedly had been), and to lead consumer
preferences rather than being led by them; Commission's Decision in Re United
Brands, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L95) 11, at para. 76, (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800.
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of effective competition, clearly it does not mean freedom to disre-
gard competition. It follows that dominance can exist even if the
dominant firm is compelled to react to its competitors' activities.
There are several possible approaches to the concept of "ef-
fective" competition, based on United Brands. First, "effective" com-
petition for the purposes of Article 86 is defined as competition
which is effective enough to prevent the market leader or leaders
from taking advantage of or abusing their respective economic pow-
ers.43 While attempts to clarify such language tend to amount to
circular arguments, this formula prompts a test: what would hap-
pen in this market if the allegedly dominant enterprise tried to
charge a high price or to practise behaviour which it clearly could
not charge or practise if competition was vigorous? If it would suc-
ceed, then this would imply dominance: if it would lose business
and be compelled to alter its policy, the implication would be one
of non-dominance. It will often be difficult to say what would hap-
pen if the market leader tried something it has never in fact done.
But it may be possible to point to some actual practise of the cor-
poration in question and argue that the practise could not have
been successful if competition had been effective, i.e., a behav-
ioural test.
Second, "effective" competition exists when no one firm domi-
nates the market to such an extent that it can unilaterally adopt
strategies sufficient to enable it substantially to contain or over-
come all sales campaigns and other competitive attacks of its com-
petitors. (A firm is dominant when it can determine the basis on
which the industry is to develop, so that it can decide on what
ground it will compete in the future.)
Third, when one firm does not lose its market share even
when its prices are consistently higher than those of its competi-
tors, competition is not "effective." A fourth approach, less explicit
but equally important, is if one firm enjoys many more competitive
advantages or features contributing to economic strength than any
other actual or potential competitor, so that it is substantially in a
different class, it is able to adopt policies in its own long term in-
terests and competition will not be effective. This is not, of course,
to suggest that dominance is the freedom to overcome any imagin-
able competition, or to charge any imaginable price, or to adopt any
43. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras.
111-29, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8429.
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conceivable policy, with impunity. Nor is it necessary for domi-
nance that the market leader should be the only firm which makes
innovations in products or marketing.
It appears that these tests of dominance are based on power,
and that this power has to be considered in the light of all the cir-
cumstances of the market. No simple tests of dominance are likely
to evolve, and different tests will give appropriate and convincing
answers in different circumstances. But it is submitted that the
Court has adopted a logical and coherent theory of dominance. Be-
cause the Court has used the words "effective competition" and
power to behave "to an appreciable extent" independently, this
theory is a practical one.
However, although the tests used are similar, dominance in
Community law is not the same as "monopoly" in United States
antitrust law.
In Community law a dominant position does not imply any
criticism or blame on the firm which occupies it. Dominance can
be acquired by entirely legitimate means. The mere existence of
the power to exclude competition, without its exercise, is lawful
under Community law. It is not necessary for the dominant de-
fendant to prove that its dominance was "thrust upon" it or was at-
tributable only to "superior skill, foresight and industry." 44 It is
only the behaviour of a dominant firm which is controlled by Arti-
cle 86. But, once dominant, a firm may not use unlawful methods
to maintain, consolidate or strengthen its dominance. It is not ab-
sence of competition, but taking advantage of it or imposing further
restrictions on competition which is unlawful.
F. Dominant Positions in Narrow Markets
A feature of Community antitrust law is the application of the
concept of dominance in narrow markets. The first important case
is General Motors v. Commission.45
The Belgian subsidiary of General Motors was the only corpo-
ration authorised by Belgian law to inspect imported GM cars and
issue certificates confirming that they complied with Belgian legis-
44. United States v. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
45. [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1367, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8320.
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lation. 46 General Motors is clearly not dominant on the market for
cars in Belgium. General Motors was found by the Commission to
have abused its monopoly by charging excessive prices for the serv-
ice of issuing the certificates. 47 The corporation argued that the ac-
tivity of certifying was not a market in itself but was merely ancil-
lary to the market in cars. The Court annulled the Commission's
decision on another ground (the excessive price had been charged
accidentally and GM had refunded the excess before the Commis-
sion's procedure had begun) but confirmed that the statutory mo-
nopoly of the power to issue certificates, combined with the free-
dom of the authorized corporation unilaterally to fix its price for
the service, created a dominant position. 48 The Advocate General
had stressed that the legal regime permitted intrabrand competi-
tion between the various models of GM cars certified by the Bel-
gian corporation and gave it power to discourage imports and to
discriminate in favour of cars assembled in Belgium.
Since General Motors, two other cases involving narrow mar-
kets have been decided by the Commission and appealed to the
Court: Hugin49 and BP-ABG. 50 The Commission found that Hugin,
a Swedish company, and its wholly owned United Kingdom subsid-
iary occupied a dominant position on the market for spare parts for
Hugin cash registers.51 The importance of the case lies in this find-
ing. The two Hugin companies had abused this dominant position
by refusing to supply Hugin spare parts to Liptons, an English
cash register maintenance company.
The finding that Hugin occupied a dominant position in the
market for spare parts for Hugin cash registers was upheld by the
Court5 2 and in a long and detailed opinion by the Advocate Gen-
eral. On the facts, however, both the Court and the Advocate Gen-
eral rejected the finding that the refusal to supply had affected
46. Id. at para. 1, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
47. Re General Motors, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L29) 14, at para. 13 (1975),
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9705.
48. General Motors v. Commission [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1367, at para. 10,
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
49. Re Hugin-Liptons, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L22), 23 (1978), [1976-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,007.
50. Re BP-ABG, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L11) 7 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9944.
51. Re Hugin-Liptons, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L22), 23, at para. 62 (1978),
[1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,007.
52. Hugin v. Commission [1979] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. __, at para. 19, 3
COMM. MKT. L.R. 345.
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trade between Member States, and the Court therefore annulled
the Commission's decision.
Hugin did not have a dominant position on the market for
cash registers. Hugin argued that the supply of spare parts and
maintenance services was merely an aspect of the competition on
the main market for cash registers. The Court said that because the
behaviour criticised was the refusal to supply spare parts to inde-
pendent maintenance companies, it was necessary to decide
whether spare parts constituted a separate market.
Acknowledging the fact that users are unable to fit spare parts
themselves, and spare parts cost little in comparison with the cost
of maintenance and repair, the Court held that users are not pur-
chasers directly on the market for spare parts. Users are, however,
buyers on the market for maintenance and repair of cash registers,
which is a market for services rather than for the sale of spare
parts. This market for services is distinct from the market for cash
registers. 53
The Court accepted the Commission's argument that there
was a market for spare parts at the level at which independent
maintenance companies are buyers of spare parts for maintenance,
repair, reconditioning and leasing out of cash registers. For all
these activities a supply of spare parts is essential and there is a
specific demand for Hugin spare parts, since they are not inter-
changeable with spare parts for cash registers of other makes. The
market for Hugin spare parts was thus a separate market and was
the "relevant market" in this case. 54
As to whether Hugin had a dominant position on this market,
Hugin had a monopoly in producing new Hugin spare parts. It was
not economical for any other enterprise to produce new parts
for Hugin cash registers. Hugin had argued that the practise of
dismantling used cash registers to obtain spare parts was sufficient
as an alternative source of supply, but the Court rejected this argu-
ment.
In the BP case, the Commission ruled that each refining com-
pany had a dominant position vis-'a-vis its previous regular custom-
ers, and that BP had unlawfully discriminated against ABG, which
had previously bought most of its petrol from BP. 55 The Court did
53. Id. at para. 6, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 345.
54. Id. at paras. 7-8, 3 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 345.
55. Re BP-ABG, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L11) 7 at paras. 78, 101 (1977),
[1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9944.
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not decide whether BP had a dominant position in the narrow mar-
ket formed only of its own customers. The Court annulled the BP-
ABG decision without discussing or deciding the question of dom-
inance, although it assumed arguendo that BP was dominant.56 The
Advocate General considered that BP was not dominant vis-h-vis
its regular customers during a temporary period of shortage when
other suppliers were not taking new customers. In his view, during
the shortage BP would have to consider the reactions of its custom-
ers after the shortage was over. If the customers felt they had been
treated badly during the shortage BP could not be dominant dur-
ing the shortage. This does not say whether a temporary situation
could involve dominance if, by action taken while it lasted, the al-
legedly dominant firm could prevent effective competition being
maintained after the temporary situation was over. In the Commis-
sion's view, this was the very situation in the BP case. The Com-
mission considered that BP's refusal to supply was likely to drive
ABG out of the market or to force it to tie itself to one of the
refining companies, thereby eliminating the only important inde-
pendent petrol wholesaler in the Netherlands market. Even if that
view of the facts is not accepted, it is suggested that if, during a
purely temporary situation, a firm is in a position either to obtain
monopoly profits or to effect competition in the long term, Article
86 should apply. 57
II. THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE UNDER ARTICLE 86
Article 86 does not define "abuse" but only gives a list of ex-
amples, corresponding to those in Article 85, of types of abuse.
56. BP v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1513, at para. 18, 3 COMM.
MKT. L.R. 174.
57. The surprising thing about these cases is not so much the legal issues that
they raise. If a distinct market for certifying services exists, and there is a monopoly
on that market, it normally follows that the monopoly is capable of abuse. The sur-
prising thing is that as a matter of antitrust enforcement policy the Commission has
chosen to decide cases of so little apparent economic importance. However, it is
worth adding that in the General Motors case the Commission saw itself as con-
cerned with interference with parallel imports and so with division of the market,
the first, worst, and best known violation in the theory of Community antitrust law
(which aims to ensure the setting up of a unified common market and not merely to
preserve competition). In the BP case, the Commission saw itself as protecting such
competition as can be provided by independent distributors in highly oligopolistic
industries and preventing the distributors from being eliminated or made dependent,
in times of recession.
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This list is not exhaustive. 58
It is suggested that the law can now be summarised as follows.
Behaviour of an enterprise (or more than one enterprise) occupying
a dominant position may be an abuse for any one or more of the
following reasons:
1. It takes advantage of its economic power so as to obtain
benefits not obtainable in normal and reasonable effective competi-
tion, at the expense of the interests of customers or consumers or
(in the case of one or more dominant buyers) of suppliers. These
can be called "exploitative" abuses.
2. It significantly restricts intrabrand or interbrand competi-
tion, or alters the market in such a way that competition is likely to
be significantly reduced, or increases or reinforces the firm's eco-
nomic power. Normal legitimate competition (providing a better
product or service or doing so at a lower price or on better terms)
is lawful, however, even if it increases the market share or eco-
nomic power of the dominant enterprise. These can be called
"anticompetitive" abuses.
3. It damages or seriously interferes with the business of an-
other enterprise. These can be called "reprisal" abuses.
These three types of infringement are not mutually exclusive.
A dominant corporation could take advantage of the absence of ef-
fective competition to restrict competition further for its own bene-
fit, thereby committing both an "exploitation" and an "anti-
competitive" abuse. A reprisal can, but need not, be carried out in
circumstances in which it substantially restricts competition.
Typically exploitative abuses can only be committed by domi-
nant corporations, because they can be committed (or at least can
be committed successfully) only in the absence of effective compe-
tition. On the other hand, anticompetitive abuses may consist of
behaviour (e.g., total requirements contracts) which can be engaged
in by enterprises with relatively little market power, but which
have serious effects on competition when engaged in by dominant
firms. The latter type of behaviour, therefore, cannot constitute ev-
idence of dominance. Exploitative abuses are prohibited even
where they do not have any adverse effect on competition. There
58. This is clear from the wording of Article 86 itself and from Continental Can
v. Commission, [1973] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171 and joined cases, Commercial Solvents v. Commission,
[1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8209.
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is no need, for example, to prove that as a result of an exploitative
abuse the financial strength of a dominant enterprise would have
been significantly increased and its dominance thereby strength-
ened.
A. Exploitative Abuses
The use of economic power by a dominant enterprise to obtain
benefits which it could not have obtained if competition had been
effective has generally been regarded as an abuse in EEC law, at
least when the use is unfair or unreasonable. 59 It is precisely be-
cause monopolies tend to use their economic power in this way
that their power must be controlled and exploitative abuses prohib-
ited, even though dominant power itself is not unlawful in Com-
munity law.
The most obvious example of exploitative abuses is monopoly
pricing. Article 86(a)60 prohibits charging unfairly high selling
prices. Except insofar as they cause the financial strength of the
dominant enterprise to be increased and weaken the finances of
buyers, for example, charging excessive prices has no anti-
competitive effects, but it is unlawful just the same.
"Limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers," prohibited by Article 86(b),6 ' deals with
exploitative abuses insofar as it prevents a dominant enterprise
from limiting its own production, markets or development, e.g., to
maintain prices or avoid making its existing products obsolete. Any
other exploitative practise which resulted in direct gain to the
dominant enterprise at the expense of customers or consumers
would also be "unfair" and unlawful.
Exploitative abuses which do not involve monopolisation are
not prohibited by United States antitrust law. Tie-ins are expressly
prohibited by Article 86(d).62 They are both exploitative (because a
tie-in imposes on the buyer an obligation to buy something he may
59. The definition of abuse in the Commission's Memorandum on Concentra-
tions is discussed in: J. MEGRET, J. Louis, D. VIGNES & M. WAELBROECK, LE
DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUT9 ECONOMIQUE EUROPtEN 68-69 (1971) and the authors
cited therein; Focsaneanu, La notion d'abus dans le systme de l'article 86 du TraitM
Institutant la CEE, in J. VAN DAMME, supra note 3, at 364-77; J. TEMPLE LANG,
THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 426 (1966). For exploitation abuse by a
monopoly buyer, see Eurofina, EEC Commission, Third Report on Competition Pol-
icy, para. 68 (1978).
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not want), and exclusionary (because it deprives competing suppli-
ers of the goods tied of an opportunity to sell their products to the
customers of the dominant firm).
Similarly, discrimination which is prohibited expressly by Arti-
cle 86(c)63 can produce both unlawful profit maximisation, taking
advantage of market power for the benefit of the dominant firm,
and anticompetitive effects insofar as it distorts competition be-
tween the customers of the dominant firm. United Brands, the
leading case on discriminatory pricing in Community law, was ar-
gued on both grounds.
Other exploitative abuses include imposition of onerous and
unreasonable terms in agreements. For example, in the Eurofina
case 64 the Commission concluded that a monopoly buyer was
violating Article 86 when the buyer insisted that it should have un-
limited rights to all patents obtained by its suppliers as a result of
contracts with it, and a right to license them to third parties with-
out additional payment. 65
In the General Motors case, the Court said that it might be
abusive to impose "a price which is excessive in relation to the eco-
nomic value of the service provided" and which discouraged paral-
lel imports or led to unfair trade.66 In that case, General Motors
conceded that the price it had charged had been excessive, but the
Court held that no abuse had been committed because the corpo-
ration, as soon as it discovered that the price was excessive, had
refunded the excess.
The annulment by the Court of the Commission's finding of
excessive prices in United Brands is more important. The Court
began by saying it was
advisable to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has
made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant posi-
tion in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it would not
have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective
competition. In this case, charging a price which is excessive be-
cause it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the
product supplied is such an abuse. 67
63. Id.
64. Eurofina, EEC Commission, Third Report on Competition Policy (1978).
65. See note 59 supra.
66. General Motors v. Commission, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1367, at para.
12, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
67. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras.
249-50, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
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The Commission had relied primarily on a relatively simple ar-
gument. United Brands had admitted that its Irish prices were
profitable, and the prices found excessive were very much higher.
The Commission had not proved the production costs involved,
however, and United Brands later claimed that the Irish prices
were unprofitable when certain unforeseen losses were taken into
account. The Court said that one way of determining objectively
whether prices were excessive would be by comparing selling price
and production cost, to calculate the profit margin: "The question
to be determined is whether the difference between the costs actu-
ally incurred and the price actually charged is excessive" and if this
is so "to consider whether a price has been imposed which is ei-
ther unfair in itself or when compared to competing products." S
The Court held that the Commission had failed, as a matter of evi-
dence, to prove its case, but approved the cost-plus method of cal-
culating profit.
The Court thus apparently approved two methods of estab-
lishing that prices were unfairly high: the cost-plus method and
comparison with prices charged in a similar but competitive mar-
ket. The latter seems to include both prices charged by one domi-
nant firm in a competitive market, and prices charged by other
firms in comparable competitive markets (subject to the "umbrella"
effect, and assuming that such markets exist). The Court, however,
gave no guidance as to the level at which prices should be consid-
ered excessive.
It is suggested that to be an abuse the value received must be
grossly disproportionate to the value given, and outside the limits
of what is reasonable. Presumably, the more necessary the goods
are to their buyers, the lower the level at which prices become un-
lawful. There is greater scope for exploitation of dominance over
necessary goods than over unnecessary luxuries. 69 As the demand
68. Id. at para. 252, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
69. The Court has commented on prices and price differences as possible
abuses of a dominant position in Parke, Davis v. Probel Reese, [1968] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 72, 73-74, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054;
Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, [1971-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. MKr. REP. (CCH) 8106, where the Court said, "[tihe differ-
ence between the ... price and the price of the product reimported from another Mem-
ber State does not necessarily suffice to disclose . . . an abuse; it may however if
unjustified by any objective criteria and if it is particularly marked, be a determining
factor in such abuse." Id. at 495. The same language was used in Sirena v. Eda,
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for necessary goods is relatively inflexible, it is important that ex-
cessive prices should not be charged for necessary products or
services. The difficulties of deciding the maximum "fair" price for
unnecessary or luxury goods are enormously greater than for essen-
tial goods.
The Court's basic test-use of dominant power to reap benefits
unobtainable in sufficiently effective competition-is not limited to
price abuses or to Article 86(a), or even to exploitative abuses. It
suggests that any behaviour is an abuse if it obtains benefits for the
dominant firm, or imposes burdens on customers or competitors,
substantially greater than would be possible if competition were ef-
fective.
B. Reprisal Abuses
There are statements in the United Brands decision to the ef-
fect that behaviour designed to damage the business of another
corporation may be an abuse, apparently even if it neither directly
benefits the dominant enterprise nor restricts competition. 70 The
statements, however, were made in connection with a refusal to
supply a distributor on the express grounds that it had participated
[1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 84-85, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 28101. In Deutsche Grammophon the Advocate General said:
previous decisions (in the Parke, Davis and Sirena cases) .. .make it clear
that .. .abuse cannot be conclusively deduced from established differences
in prices, although they may be a factor determining the existence of a situa-
tion in which there is an abuse of a dominant position if they are particu-
larly great and cannot be justified objectively .. .it is necessary to consider
not only the maufacturer's selling prices but also the retail prices, and ...
the different burdens of value added tax ... must be taken into account and
that different costs may be due to the marketing structure and to the amount
of the copyright royalties to be paid to the ...German Performing Rights
Society. . . .If. . .the differences in price are considerable and dispropor-
tionate, and constitute decisive evidence of an abuse of a dominant position
within the market, according to previous case-law the use of industrial prop-
erty rights for the purposes of partitioning the market and the maintenance
of the price difference must be held to constitute an abuse and fall within
the prohibition of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty .. .the fact that in the Mem-
ber State in which it occupies .a dominant position it applies prices which,
without any objective justification, are considerably above the price level in
other Member States must be regarded as important evidence of abuse.
Id. at 512, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8106. See also Re
Peelers Co., 65 F.T.C. 799 (1964); C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra note 3, at 198.
70. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras.
182-83, 191-94, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
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in the sales campaign of a competitor of United Brands, so that the
refusal to supply discouraged interbrand competition.
It is suggested that an action by a dominant enterprise which
is designed to injure another firm and which goes further than is
essential merely to safeguard the legitimate interests of the former
is likely to be an abuse. This would be so if the action were in-
tended to punish or penalise the smaller firm, e.g., for promoting a
product of a competitor of the dominant enterprise or for making a
complaint to an antitrust authority against the dominant enterprise,
or to warn the smaller firm not to compete too vigorously. As such
reprisals undoubtedly occur, and in any case are feared, it is im-
portant to be clear that they are normally abuses of a kind for
which the Commission should be particularly ready to fine.
Such reprisals would normally be anticompetitive in intent, or
at least be intended to punish or penalise procompetitive behav-
iour. Whether such action would be an abuse if there were no
anticompetitive element is an open question. Therefore, it is not
clear if reprisal abuses should be regarded as distinct from
anticompetitive abuses.
C. Anticompetitive Abuses
At least some of the abuses listed in Article 86 have
anticompetitive effects. Limiting production, markets or technical
development of firms other than the dominant enterprise implies
anticompetitive behaviour. Discrimination is prohibited expressly
when it puts some firms at a competitive disadvantage. Tie-ins are
an abuse not only against those forced to buy goods or services
they do not want with the "tying" goods which they do want, but
also against competing suppliers of the goods or services "tied." 71
More generally, since the examples in Articles 85 and 86 are writ-
ten in almost the same words, it is clear that Article 86 covers
anticompetitive behaviour similar to that prohibited by Article 85
when practised jointly.
In Continental Can, the Court held that it was an abuse for a
company already in a dominant position to strengthen its position
further and to reduce the scope for competition by acquiring a
competitor. 72 This judgment determined definitely that Article 86
71. See Continental Can v. Commission [1973] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 215, at para.
26, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
72. Id., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
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applied to mergers; its implications for other types of anti-
competitive abuse were less discussed. Thus, if both behaviour,
which takes direct advantage of dominant power, and structural
measures such as mergers, which lessen competition only indi-
rectly, are abuses, it would be irrational if behaviour which had a
direct effect on competition (e.g., exclusionary behaviour) were not
an abuse. In Continental Can, the Court rejected the argument
that an abuse can be committed only if dominant power is used to
commit it; acquisition of a competitor by a dominant enterprise is
unlawful even if it could have carried out the same acquisition if it
had not been dominant. Therefore, a fortiori behaviour restricting
competition directly and involving use of dominant power must be
unlawful.
Since Article 86 clearly prohibits some abuses because they re-
strict competition, it would be irrational and anomalous if it did not
restrict all behaviour which has that effect. Once over the thresh-
old of dominance, an enterprise should be prevented from taking
advantage of its existing market power in any way to restrict com-
petition further. There could be no sound economic reason for pre-
venting a dominant firm from taking advantage of its power to ben-
efit itself by exploitative abuses while allowing it to take advantage
of its power to benefit itself more, and more permanently, by ex-
clusionary practises. "If monopoly power can be used to beget mo-
nopoly, the Act becomes a feeble instrument indeed. " 73 And there
could be no sound economic basis for allowing an already dominant
enterprise to use some techniques of restricting competition while
prohibiting others. This is particularly true of methods of re-
stricting competition which can be practised only by enterprises
which already have considerable market power. Also, if Article 86
were confined to classical restraints of trade or to any given list of
types of behaviour, dominant firms would be able to devise new
exclusionary practises and practise them with impunity. It does not
appear that the practises described in Article 86 are always likely
to be seriously objectionable and that by contrast other practises
should be prohibited only if, in the particular circumstances, sub-
stantial competitive impact (or some other objectionable effect) can
be shown. 74
73. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948).
74. This is not the view of Siragusa, Application of Article 86: Tying Ar-
rangements, Refusals to Deal, Discrimination and Other Cases of Abuse, in J. VAN
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If an enterprise in a dominant position, however, is the most
efficient enterprise on the relevant market, its selling prices and
other normal and legitimate competitive behaviour will tend to
cause its market share to increase at the expense of its competitors.
This is not a violation of Article 86, as long as its behaviour is
indeed confined to legitimate competition. This was pointed out
by the Commission in its written arguments in the National
Carbonising case,75 and is implied by the Court's decision in
Hoffmann-LaRoche.76 Also, anticompetitive behaviour which would
otherwise constitute an abuse is probably lawful if under the cir-
cumstances it is essential in the long term for the continued sur-
vival of the dominant enterprise.
The general principle that all behaviour restricting competition
is an abuse is consistent with the language of the Court in de-
scribing a dominant position. The Court has repeatedly described
dominance as "power to impede the maintenance of effective com-
petition." 77 This power could hardly constitute the essential test of
dominance if its use to impede effective competition was not, or
was not necessarily, an unlawful misuse of dominant power. Apart
from these arguments, the conclusion that all anticompetitive
behaviour by dominant firms is unlawful can be drawn from the
judgements of the Court.
Thus, in Continental Can the Court said that Articles 85 and
86 were "based on" Article 3(f) 78 which obliges the Community to
DAMME, supra note 3, at 398. Yet, prima facie, refusals to deal and acquisition of
competitors by dominant firms are probably more likely to have a substantial effect
on competition than the practises listed in Article 86.
75. Temple Lang, L'affaire National Carbonising, (1977) CAHIERS DE Dnorr
EUROPAEN 506, 514; reply to parliamentary questions in Re National Carbonising, 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L35) 8 (1976); EEC Commission, Fifth Report on Competi-
tion, Policy 60-61 (1976).
76. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, [1979] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 461, 3
COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
77. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 65,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429. But see Metro v. Com-
mission, [1977] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1875, 1902, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; EMI v. CBS, [1976] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 811, 849, [1976
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8350; Sugar Cartel cases, [1975] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 1663, 1978, 1994, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334; Sirena v. Eda, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 69, 83, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 28101; Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 487, 501, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8106.
78. Article 3(f): "For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activi-
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ensure that competition is not distorted or a fortiori eliminated. 79
ties of the Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing pro-
vided for in this Treaty. . .the establishment of a system ensuring that competition
shall not be distorted in the Common Market .. " EEC Treaty, supra note 1.
79. Continental Can v. Commission, [1973] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 215, [1971-1973
Tranfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171, reads in part:
[t]he question is whether the word "abuse" in Article 86 refers only to prac-
tises of'undertakings which may directly affect the market and are detrimen-
tal to production or sales, to purchasers or consumers, or whether this word
refers also to changes in the structure of an undertaking, which lead to com-
petition being seriously disturbed in a substantial part of the Common Mar-
ket. The distinction between measures which concern the structure of the
undertaking and practises which affect the market cannot be decisive, for
any structural measure may influence market conditions, if it increases the
size and the economic power of the undertaking. In order to answer this
question, one has to go back to the spirit, general scheme and wording of
Article 86, as well as to the system and objectives of the Treaty. These prob-
lems thus cannot be solved by comparing this Article with certain provisions
of the ECSC Treaty. Article 86 is part of the chapter devoted to the common
rules on the Community's policy in the field of competition. This policy is
based on Article 3(f) of the Treaty according to which the Community's ac-
tivity shall include the institution of a system ensuring that competition in
the Common Market is not distorted. The applicant's argument .... ignores
the fact that Article 3 considers the pursuit of the objectives which it lays
down to be indispensable for the achievement of the Community's tasks.
* . .But if Article 3(f) provides for the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the Common Market is not distorted, then it requires a
fortiori that competition must not be eliminated. . . .With a view to safe-
guarding the principles and attaining the objectives set out in Articles 2 and
3 of the Treaty, Article 85 to 90 have laid down general rules applicable to
undertakings.... Articles 85 and 86 seek to achieve the same aim on differ-
ent levels, viz. the maintenance of effective competition within the Common
Market. The restraint of competition which is prohibited if it is the result of
behaviour falling under Article 85, cannot become permissible by the fact
that such behaviour succeeds under the influence of a dominant undertaking
and results in the merger of the undertakings concerned .... The endeavour
of the authors of the Treaty to maintain in the market real or potential com-
petition even in cases in which restraints on competition are permitted, was
explicity laid down in Article 85(3)(b) of the Treaty .... [T]he obligation to
observe the basic objectives of the Treaty, in particular that of Article 3(f),
results from the obligatory force of these objectives. In any case Articles 85
and 86 cannot be interpreted in such a way that they contradict each other,
because they serve to achieve the same aim .... Article 86 . . .states a cer-
tain number of abusive practises which it prohibits. The list merely gives
examples, not an exhaustive enumeration of the sort of abuses of a dominant
position prohibited by the Treaty. As may further be seen from letters (c)
and (d) of Article 86(2), the provision is not only aimed at practises which
may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detri-
mental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure,
such as is mentioned in Article 3(f) of the Treaty. Abuse may therefore occur
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There must be no lacuna in the antitrust law of the Treaty, stated
the Court. This means that the Treaty must prohibit at least all
anticompetitive behaviour which makes use of dominant power and
which could not be practised if competition were effective.
In the light of this and of the similar reasoning in Commercial
Solvents,8" United Brands and Hoffmann-LaRoche, perhaps the
strongest legal argument for the view that Article 86 outlaws all
anticompetitive behaviour is Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty. Once
it is accepted that Article 3(f) can be used to define what practises
are prohibited by Article 86, it necessarily follows that all behav-
iour (not merely mergers) which distorts or a fortiori restricts or
eliminates competition is unlawful. (It also seems to follow that
normal fair competition is authorised, even if it tends to allow a
competitor to increase his market share towards monopoly.)
The Court in Commercial Solvents, basing itself on Article 3(f),
held that a refusal by a monopoly to supply a customer with a raw
material was contrary to Article 86 where it would have had the ef-
fect of putting that customer out of the market for products de-
rived from the raw material in question."' It was clear that
Commerical Solvents wished to facilitate its entry into the market
for the derived product by eliminating a competitor. The question
whether its refusal to supply would have been lawful if it had
needed its total production of the raw material to produce the de-
if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such position in such a
way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition,
i.e., that only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends
on the dominant one. Such being the meaning and the scope of Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty, the question of the link of causality raised by the appli-
cants which in their opinion has to . . . exist between the dominant position
and its abuse, is of no consequence, for the strengthening of the position of
an undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited under Article 86 of the
Treaty, regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved, if it
has the effects mentioned above.
Id. at paras. 20-27.
In its Memorandum on Concentrations in 1966 the Commission said that any be-
haviour by a dominant firm was an abuse if it was contrary to the objectives of the
Treaty (including presumably Article 3(f)) and that abuses could be committed
against actual and potential competitors, suppliers, users and consumers. The Com-
mission went on to say that pricing below cost would be an abuse if it was intended
to eliminate a competitor or compel it to merge against its will or on unfavourable
terms. Italy v. Commission [1966] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 564, [1961-1966 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8048.
80. Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209.
81. Id. at para. 25, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209.
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rived product economically did not arise; no justification was
pleaded.
This was a striking decision because Article 86 does not ex-
pressly prohibit refusals to supply or cessation of supplies. Clearly
this was an anticompetitive abuse involving interference with inter-
brand competition at the finished products level.
In the Sugar Cartel case,82 the Court made several rulings
which show that Article 86 prohibits anticompetitive abuses. The
Court said that by compelling dealers to channel their exports to
specific consignees or destinations and to impose these restrictions
on their own customers, the dominant enterprise had restricted the
outlets of the dealers and their customers. The Court held that so
limiting the markets of other firms was a violation of Article
86(b). 8 3
The Court also said that clauses prohibiting the handling of
competing brands, if imposed on independent agents, are an abuse
if the clauses consolidate the dominant position.84 Even if the
agents are not independent, such clauses are unlawful if competi-
tors are thereby deprived of access to the only dealers who can
market their products on an appropriate scale. The Court held that
rebates given only to dealers who bought exclusively from one pro-
ducer (SZV), involved both illegal discrimination (because two buy-
ers buying the same quantity would be treated differently if one
bought, elsewhere as well) and limited the markets of competitors
of SZV, and was also illegal because they would further consolidate
SZV's dominant position. 85 The Court thus confirmed that Article
86(b) prohibits a dominant enterprise from limiting the markets of
its customers and its competitors, and that Article 86 prohibits
practises tending to strengthen an existing dominant position.
82. [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1663, at paras. 399, 482-83, 486, 523-27, [1975
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334.
83. Sugar Cartel case, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1663, at para. 5, [1975 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. Micr. REP. (CCH) 8334.
84. Id. at para. 8, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334.
Even clauses prohibiting competition imposed by an undertaking occupying a
dominant position on trade representatives may constitute an abuse, if foreign com-
petitors find that there are no independent operators who can market the product in
question on a sufficiently large scale, and are in practise forced to apply to the said
undertaking's trade representatives if they wish to sell this product in the latter's
sales territory, or if the said undertaking enlarges the scope of the prohibition of
competition to such an extent that it no longer corresponds to the nature of the legal
and economic relationship in question.
85. Id. at para. 7, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334.
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In the SABAM case86 the Court had to consider the principles
relating to a national copyright monopoly which was said to be im-
posing "unfair trading conditions" contrary to Article 86(a) on au-
thors assigning their rights to it. The Court said that a balance was
needed between the maximum freedom for authors and the effec-
tive management of their copyright rights, in their own interests.
8 7
For the monopoly effectively to protect the authors' interests, their
rights had to be assigned to it. Imposing on authors obligations
which were not "absolutely necessary" to the aims of the monopoly
and which therefore encroached unfairly on the authors' freedom to
exercise their copyrights would be an abuse. The language of the
Court makes it clear that this is an anticompetitive abuse, although
the Court, of course, did not use that term to describe it.
In United Brands the Court held that there had been three
abuses: a prohibition on resale by distributors of unripened ba-
nanas, a refusal to supply a distributor, and discriminatpry prices.
The Court ruled that a fourth abuse, excessive prices, had not
been proved. 88
The prohibition on resale of unripened bananas was, of course,
a restraint on intrabrand competition. The Court held that it lim-
ited the markets of the dealers and was contrary to Article 86(b). 89
The Court also referred to the fact that the prohibition prevented
the dealers from increasing their economic power vis-4-vis United
86. B.R.T. v. SABAM, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 313, at paras. 8-15, [1974
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8268. As the Court was acting under Ar-
ticle 177 of the EEC Treaty, it did not determine how the rules it laid down applied
to the facts before the national court. See also Sacchi v. Commission, [1974] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 409, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8267 (unfair
or discriminatory charges or conditions imposed on advertisers by a television mo-
nopoly): Commission decision in Re GEMA, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L134) 15
(1971), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9438 (copyright so-
ciety); Van Ameyde v. V.C.I., [1977] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1091, Opinion of Advocate
General at 1137, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8425.
87. B.R.T. v. SABAM, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 313, at para. 8, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8268.
88. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para. 267,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429. In Deutsche
Grammophon v. Metro, the territorial protection when coupled with a dominant po-
sition may be an abuse. [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, at 512, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8106. It seems likely that all behaviour by a
dominant enterprise restricting exports from one Member State to another is likely to
be contrary to Article 86 at least if it is combined with another abuse. C. BELLAMY &
G. CHILD, supra note 3, at 194-195.
89. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at paras.
159-161, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
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Brands, and enabled United Brands to practise discriminatory
pricing.90
As to the refusal to supply a distributor, the Court said that
cessation of supplies to a long standing customer is inconsistent
with Articles 3(f) and 86 because it limits markets and involves dis-
crimination. 91 Even a measure protecting the commercial interests
of the dominant enterprise is unlawful "if its actual purpose is to
strengthen this dominant position."9 2 As the refusal to supply had
been imposed because the dealer had promoted a competitor's
brand, it was likely to deter interbrand competition and make
United Brands' position of strength more effective.
In Hoffmann-La Roche93 the Court held that an obligation or a
promise by customers to buy all or a considerable proportion of
their requirements exclusively from the dominant enterprise is an
abuse, whether or not there is a corresponding obligation to give
fidelity rebates. It is also an abuse if fidelity rebates are given un-
der contract, even without any obligation on the part of the cus-
tomer, or unilaterally without contract. They are incompatible with
the aim of undistorted competition because they are not based on
an economic service justifying them, but tend to take away or re-
strain customers' right of choice and to prevent other suppliers
from having access to the market. Fidelity rebates discriminate be-
tween buyers who buy exclusively from the dominant seller and
buyers who do not, even if they buy the same quantities. They also
tend to reinforce the seller's dominant position through competi-
tion which is not based on service and is therefore distorted.
The Court gave what is in substance a definition of "abuse":
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the be-
haviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such
as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the
very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of
competition is weakened and which, through recourse to meth-
ods different from those which condition normal competition in
90. Id. at para. 160, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
91. Id., at paras. 182-83 (Opinion of the Advocate General, at 335), [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
92. Id. at para. 189, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
93. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, [1979] C.J. COMM. E. REc. 461, 3
COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
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products or services on the basis of the transactions of commer-
cial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth
of that competition. 94
The Court again stressed that in such a market "all additional
restrictions on this competitive structure are likely to constitute an
abuse of a dominant position." 95 After referring to Article 3(f), the
Court repeated what it had said in Commercial Solvents: that Arti-
cle 86 applies not only to practises likely to injure consumers di-
rectly but also to those which injure them indirectly by affecting
the structure of effective competition.9 6
It will be seen that the Court has for the first time defined
"abuse," and has done so in terms of anticompetitive abuses. (Only
anticompetitive abuses were involved in the case: the Court cer-
tainly did not mean that exploitive behaviour is not an abuse.) All
behaviour which affects the structure of a market and which re-
stricts existing competition or prevents competition developing is
an abuse, and a distinction is made between normal competitive
practises with a legitimate economic justification and practises, the
principal effects of which are anticompetitive.
This judgment confirms the consistency of the Court's ap-
proach to Article 86, and greatly strengthens the argument that Ar-
ticle 86 prohibits all exclusionary practises, whatever their nature,
which restrict interbrand competition.
The BP case 97 concerned a refusal to supply during the petrol
shortage in the Netherlands in 1973. Owing to the Arab boycott,
the refining companies were refusing to supply new customers. It
was uneconomic to import refined petrol in the Netherlands, due
to maximum prices imposed by the Dutch Government. The Court
pointed out that before the oil crisis BP had legitimately ended its
supply contract with ABG and since then had been supplying re-
fined petrol to ABG only as advances under a contract for refining
crude oil to be provided by ABG. The Court concluded that at the
crucial time ABG was only an "occasional" customer of BP for re-
fined petrol and not a regular customer, and that BP therefore was
not obliged to give ABG the same treatment as those who were
94. Id. at para. 91, 3 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
95. Id. at paras. 91, 123, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
96. Id. at para. 125, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 211.
97. Re BP-ABG, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L.11) 7 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 9944.
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still its regular customers (which would have involved a smaller re-
duction in quantities supplied).98 The Court said that, in the ab-
sence of special legislation, BP could not be obliged to treat ABG
similarly to its other customers, without regard to the supply con-
tracts it had entered into with them. The Court added that, through
informal intervention, the Netherlands authorities had ensured that
ABG obtained some supplies to keep it going during the shortage,
thereby implying that BP might have had some duty to supply
ABG if ABG had had no other source of supply. 99
Although the judgment is not very easy to apply to other situ-
ations, the essence of it is that BP was entitled to differentiate in
favour of its customers with long term contracts as opposed to a
company in ABG's position, an entirely reasonable result. The
Court dealt with the Commission's second argument, that BP had
treated ABG worse than any other customers, even those without
supply contracts, only by implying that any duty BP might have
had toward ABG was ended by the fact that ABG's most vital
needs were met from other sources. It could not have been sug-
gested that BP's supply contracts had been intended to have exclu-
sionary effects. The case, therefore, does not seem to have any im-
plications for a situation in which a dominant firm adopts conduct
with serious exclusionary effects which is not called for by its nor-
mal (i.e., non-exclusionary) contractual obligations to third parties.
The BP case and the Court's ruling in Sugar Cartel on SZV's
prohibition against handling competing brands both indicate, there-
fore, that normal commercial behaviour which is lawful if it has
minimal effects on competition will be unlawful if the circum-
stances cause it to have serious effects on competition. In other
words, the existence of the duty will depend on the degree and ex-
tent of the reasonably foreseeable effects on competition. This is an
objective test.
The Court has not yet had to decide a case in which the exclu-
sionary behaviour was said to be necessary and normal competitive
practise in the interests of the dominant enterprise. The Commis-
sion, however, expressed a view on substantially this situation in
the National Carbonising case, 100 although this case was withdrawn
98. BP v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1513, at paras. 32-33, 3
COMM. MKT. L.R. 174.
99. Id. at paras. 38-40, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 174.
100. National Carbonising v. Commission, [19751 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1193;
EEC Commission Fifth Report on Competition Policy 60-61 (1976); EEC Commis-
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before the Court decided the merits. National Carbonising bought
coal for making domestic coke from the United Kingdom National
Coal Board. The Coal Board, which also sold domestic coke, had a
dominant position in Britain for both coal and coke. National
Carbonising claimed that it was forced out of business because the
margin between the price it had to pay for coal for making domes-
tic coke and the market price for the coke, both of which were
fixed by the Coal Board, was insufficient to allow an independent
coke producer to survive. The Commission considered that there
was no abuse, because coke producers also make industrial coke,
the prices of which were different and on which profits could be
made; the Commission concluded that the Coal Board's pricing
policy on domestic coke alone could not put a coke producer out of
the market.' 0 ' Moreover, the Commission added obiter, the Coal
Board could not be legally obliged to reduce its price for coal for
domestic coke, because it was already selling it at a loss, and could
not be obliged to increase its price for domestic coke, because to
do so would damage the coal industry by causing coke consumers
to change over to gas or electricity. It is clear that a dominant en-
terprise cannot have a duty to make a loss in order to provide a
profit for a customer whose losses would otherwise exclude it from
the market. 10 2 The Commission considered that what would other-
wise have been an abuse was justified by the risk to the Coal
Board's own business. On this view of the facts, the opinion
amounts to saying that a dominant enterprise is not obliged to
damage seriously its own business, and certainly is not obliged to
risk its own existence in the long term, in order to keep a competi-
tor alive. Even policies with significant exlusionary effects may be
lawful if all other possible policies would seriously weaken the
dominant firm vis-a-vis competitors not subject to the alleged ex-
clusionary effects. Clearly, however, the interest of a dominant en-
terprise cannot normally outweigh substantial ill-effects on compe-
tition.
It is apparent that the entire case was based on the exclusion-
sion, Seventh Report on Competition Policy 113-14 (1978); Temple Lang, supra
note 75.
101. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d
1264 (9th Cir. 1975) on substitutability in production.
102. "The antitrust laws were not intended, and may not be used, to require
businesses to price their products at unreasonably high prices (which penalize the
consumer) so that less efficient competitors can stay in business." Hanson v. Shell
Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
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ary effect of the Coal Board's two prices in combination. No con-
ventional restraint of trade or exclusionary practise was involved,
nor was it argued that the price for coal was otherwise excessive or
that the price for domestic coke was otherwise predatory.
Because Community law clearly does not object to the exis-
tence of monopoly or dominant power, it is compelled to seek a
clear rule on behaviour by dominant firms. The search for such a
rule will compel Community law to try to draw the line, on one
hand between legitimate methods of competition which may derive
some of their efficacy from the size and strength of the firm em-
ploying them, and on the other hand unlawful practises which may
involve restricting significantly the scope for competitors or taking
advantage of market power. The only case in which these issues
have been raised, but not answered, was National Car-
bonising.
The better view seems to be that normal competitive behav-
iour which increases a dominant firm's market share but which nei-
ther exploits the relative absence of competition nor excludes com-
petition (and which only increases the firm's power to exclude
competition to the extent and in the manner that any increase in
market share may necessarily have that effect) is lawful. Behaviour
which increases market share primarily or exclusively by signifi-
cantly excluding competitors and so restricting interbrand competi-
tion is not. Behaviour which tends to exclude competitors more
than to sell the products of the dominant firm practising it, is un-
lawful. The test seems to be if the competition-restricting (i.e., ex-
clusionary effect for competitors) is greater or more important than
the other effects on the customer or the dominant firm, and is sig-
nificant, the practise is unlawful,103 at least unless the dominant
103. Similarly, a restrictive agreement cannot be approved under Article 85(3)
if its restrictive effects outweigh the benefits to be obtained from it. On this basis,
therefore, Community law also forbids "the use of monopoly power, however
lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to de-
stroy a competitor .... . Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 336 (1973),
reh. denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
"It is necessary to examine the economic context in which the conduct takes
place to determine whether the restrictive effects outweigh the benefits. And typi-
cally the restrictive effects will vary directly with the market power of the firm in-
volved." Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281,
314 (1956); "[M]arket power may be an essential ingredient in determining the pro-
priety of some kinds of conduct which may have a business justification." Turner,
The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1207, 1229 (1969).
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firm could not reasonably have known of the exclusionary ef-
fects. 10 4 Neither the Commission nor the Court has hitherto spent
much time discussing purpose or intent, and except for General
Motors, the Court does not seem to have treated it as important.
The entire Continental Can judgment implies that the test is what
behaviour is objectively contrary to the Treaty. The better view is
that intent is relevant when the dominant firm did not know and
could not reasonably have known that its practise was
anticompetitive or exploitative, and then corrected its error when
it discovered it. If it knew or should have known of the
anticompetitive effects of what it was doing, any intent which the
law requires is sufficiently proved. However, fines may be imposed
only when the violative behaviour was deliberate or negligent un-
der Regulation 17/62.105
For a lengthy but nevertheless incomplete list of practises which United States
courts have held to be unlawful monopolising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
see Cooper, supra note 38, at 445-50.
104. "[E]ven if we assume that a specific intent to accomplish that result is ab-
sent, he is chargeable in legal contemplation with that purpose since the end result
is the necessary and direct consequence of what he did." United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. at 108 (1948). In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), Judge Wyzan-
ski said "it is a violation of [section] 2 [of the Sherman Act] for one having effective
control of the market to use, or to plan to use, any exclusionary practice, even
though it is not a technical restraint of trade." Id. at 342 (emphasis added). The words
italicized may go further than the Community law but the rest of this statement prob-
ably states it accurately. But "a mixture of motives is not good enough under the rule
in Alcoa: where 'honestly industrial' aims and exclusionary aims-or effects-go to-
gether, the latter [will] prevail legally." A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 123 (2d ed. 1970). The rule as suggested in the text
above does not go so far as this but corresponds to L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 99 (1977): "a firm violates section 2 if it gains or holds mo-
nopoly power through conduct which is not a normal industrial response to market
opportunities, but is primarily aimed at limiting the opportunities of competitors, so as
to drive them out of the market," and cites United States v. American Tobacco, 221
U.S. 106 (1911). Sullivan concludes that "conduct which tends to erect barriers to the
entry or expansion of other firms is exclusionary, and supplies the conduct element
in the offense of monopolisation." L. SULLIVAN, supra at 101. See Korah, Interpreta-
tion and Application of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome: Abuse of the Dominant
Position within the Common Market, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 768 (1978):
In Continental Can [t]he Court provided the Commission with the means to
control anticompetitive conduct adopted by firms already enjoying a domi-
nant position-not only horizontal mergers, but presumably any behaviour
that might substantially reduce competition between existing suppliers or
customers, or raise barriers to entry without conferring countervailing bene-
fits on consumers.
Id. at 774-75.
105. Regulation 17/62, 13 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L13) 204 (1962), of which Arti-
cle 15 reads as follows:
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITIONS
In Community law proof of some behaviour tending to exploit
dominance or to restrict competition seems necessary for abuse;
mere "intent and purpose"'10 6 to exclude competitors, without any
(1) The Commission may by means of a decision impose on enterprises and
associations of enterprises fines of from one hundred to five thousand units
of account where, wilfully or through negligence:
(a) they supply false or misleading information in an application
submitted pursuant to Article 2 or in a notification made pursuant to Articles
4 and 5;
(b) they supply false information in reply to a request made pursuant to
Article 11, paragraph 3 or 5, or to Article 12, or do not supply information
within a time-limit fixed by a decision taken under Article 11, paragraph 5;
or
(c) they submit in incomplete form, on the occasion of investigations
carried out under Article 13 or Article 14, the books or other business docu-
ments required, or decline to submit to an investigation ordered by means of
a decision taken pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 3.
(2) The Commission may by means of a decision impose on enterprises and
associations of enterprises fines of from one thousand to one million units of
account: this last figure may be increased to 10% of the turnover of the pre-
ceding business year of each of the enterprises having taken part in the in-
fringement where these enterprises, wilfully or through negligence:
(a) have infringed the provisions of Article 85, paragraph 1, or of Article
86 of the Treaty, or
(b) have infringed a stipulation made under Article 8, paragraph 1. In
determining the amount of the fine the duration of the infringement shall be
considered in addition to its gravity.
(3) Article 10, paragraphs 3 to 6, shall apply.
(4) The decisions taken under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall have no penal char-
acter.
(5) The fines provided for in paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), may not be
imposed for actions taking place:
(a) after the notification to the Commission and prior to its decision re-
garding the application of Article 85, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in so far as
these actions do not go beyond the limits of the activity described in the no-
tification;
(b) prior to the notification of and within the framework of the agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices existing at the date of entry into
force of the present Regulation, provided that this notification has been
made within the time-limits laid down in Article 5, paragraph 1, and Article
7, paragraph 2.
(6) Paragraph 5 shall not apply once the Commission has informed the en-
terprises concerned that after a preliminary examination it considers that the
conditions of Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty have been fulfilled and
that application of Article 85, paragraph 3, is not warranted.
C. OBERDORFER, A. GLEISS & M. HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 443-44
at 148-50 (CCH 1963).
106. Justice Burton in American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, (1946)
said:
A correct interpretation of the statute and of the authorities makes it the
crime of monopolizing, under section 2 of the Sherman Act, for parties .. .to
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act in furtherance of the intent, is not enough, although actual suc-
cess in exclusion or exploitation is not necessary.
A principle along these lines would have several merits. First,
it would prevent the outcome depending on evidence of subjec-
tive intent, which seems unsatisfactory in cases of single firm
monopolising. Second, it should make it possible for an honest firm
to tell in advance whether given behaviour is likely to be unlawful
or not. Thirdly, it should not inhibit bona fide competitive behav-
iour provided that dominant enterprises do not try to go as close as
they can to the extreme limits of the law. Fourth, it avoids (at least
in relation to anticompetitive abuses) discussion of economic per-
formance, which seems difficult ground for both advising and
adjudicating lawyers, especially as economists have not so far
agreed on objective practical tests of economic performance.
Community law, like United States law, will be obliged to
deal with the problem of remedy where dominance has been main-
tained or strengthened by unlawful methods, even though it is the
methods and not the dominance which are unlawful. Mere termi-
nation of the abuse, allowing the firm to retain power unlawfully
acquired, may obviously be an insufficient remedy. Only to this ex-
tent does it seem that Community law is concerned with the
causes of dominance.
D. Discrimination
It is convenient to discuss discrimination separately from other
abuses.
1. Article 86(c) makes it an abuse for an enterprise in a domi-
nant position to apply "dissimilar conditions to equivalent trans-
actions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a com-
petitive disadvantage.' ' 10 7 The last words suggest that the clause
prohibits primarily interference with actual or potential competi-
tion between buyers, i.e., second line competition.
But discrimination and differential pricing may also be unfair
acquire or maintain the power to exclude competitors from any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, pro-
vided they also have such a power that they are able .. .to exclude actual or
potential competition from the field and provided they have the intent and
purpose to exercise that power .... [N]either proof of exertion of the power
to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors
is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization .... Id. at 809-10.
See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
107. See note 2 supra.
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under Article 86(a) or for other reasons under different legal rules.
2. An abuse occurs if "unfair" and excessive prices are
charged to the customers differentiated against (an exploitative
abuse). Charging such prices would not be unlawful primarily be-
cause of discrimination, but if the lower prices were charged in a
competitive market the difference might be evidence that the
higher prices were unfair, and might be unfair to the extent of the
difference.
3. An abuse occurs if the lower prices are below or near cost
and are exclusionary and so "unfair" under Article 86(a) (an anti-
competitive abuse). Not all prices, even below cost, are exclusion-
ary.' 08 Even prices slightly above cost, but below any normally ac-
ceptable rate of return, at least if they are charged locally or
temporarily, may have exclusionary effects. This is so especially if
low prices are charged differentially to discourage potential en-
trants, or to punish and exclude actual entrants. Normally, poten-
tial entrants expect rather higher returns than those demanded by
firms which have already invested capital in the market. In such
circumstances the prices are not unlawful primarily because they
are discriminatory, but evidence of differentiation may be impor-
tant. Cost analysis and evidence of intent would normally be rele-
vant.
4. An abuse occurs if the differentiation is contrary to a basic
rule of fair and equal treatment of customers, e.g., the rule against
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. This is unlawful, even
if the dominant enterprise does not benefit from the discrimination
(e.g., the case of a state-owned industry which discriminates in fa-
vour of its own nationals or in favour of certain trade channels or
commercial operators) and even if the customers do not compete
with one another. 10 9
5. An abuse occurs if the differentiation is exclusionary in ef-
fect, e.g., if a buyer is charged more or gets less if he also buys
from another supplier, or if he does not buy a second product as
well as the product for which the seller is dominant (a price re-
duction to induce a tie-in), or if a dominant buyer offers more
favourable terms to a supplier if it sells to nobody else. 110 This is
108. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 386.
109. Sacchi v. Commission, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 409, at paras. 8, 14, 17,
[1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8267 (the Telebiella Television
case).
110. This seems clear from the Court's judgments in the Sugar Cartel case on
SZV's rebates and in Hoffmann-LaRoche. See note 118 infra.
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an abuse interfering with competitors of the dominant supplier
(first line competition), and would be unlawful whether or not
there was an effect on second line competition as well.
A dominant enterprise normally discriminates for its own ben-
efit, not for the benefit of preferred customers. Price differentiation
not based on cost differences, especially if supported by restrictions
on resale by customers as in United Brands, is normally a profit
maximising device."' In United Brands the Court upheld a finding
of discriminatory pricing on the grounds that it interfered with free
movement of goods, artifically separated national markets and dis-
torted competition. 1 12 In the pleadings more emphasis had been
111. See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the An-
titrust Laws (1955):
A single monopolist firm, or a group of firms exerting monopoly power
in concert, would find it most profitable to divide up their customers and ex-
act from each one the maximum that he could be made to pay. Such a
scheme of discrimination would require that customers paying lower prices
be prevented from reselling to those paying higher prices. The monopolist
would need to control the product to point of final use, possibly by contract.
If resale were practical, then competition among the customers would cause
all the product to move through the lower-price buyers, discrimination thus
tending to disappear.
Price discrimination may also take the form of predatory price cutting in
selected areas or on selected products in order to eliminate competitors or to
force them to follow a price or other policy. The essence of this conduct is
its temporary nature; for it only exists in order that prices may eventually be
raised once rivals are removed or coerced. Such predator price discrimina-
tion must, however, be carefully distinguished from vigorous competition
where prices are not cut for such temporary purposes, but in order to permit
more efficient firms to earn higher profits at low prices than at high prices,
or for some other equally competitive reason.
Id. at 335.
The Commission's decision in Re United Brands, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L95)
11 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800, said: "For
an undertaking in a dominant position, a policy of systematically setting prices at the
highest possible level, resulting in wide price differences, cannot be objectively
justified, particularly where that undertaking maintains market segregation." Id. at
para. 97.
112. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, reads:
Once it can be grasped that differences in transport costs, taxation, cus-
toms duties, the wages of the labour force, the conditions of marketing, the
differences in the parity of currencies, the density of competition may even-
tually culminate in different retail selling price levels according to the Mem-
ber States, then it follows that those differences are factors which UBC only
has to take into account to a limited extent since it sells a product which
is always the same and at the same place to ripener/distributors who
-alone-bear the risks of the consumers' market.
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITIONS
placed on the profits made by United Brands from its discrimina-
tory pricing than on the distortion of second line competition, and
it had been argued that the policies of United Brands put its cus-
tomers at a disadvantage vis-h-vis United Brands by restricting
their activities and weakening their bargaining power (a "vertical"
competitive disadvantage, rather than a competitive disadvantage
in second line competition).
In United Brands the Court stressed that United Brands sold
only to wholesale distributor/ripeners and itself incurred none of
the costs related to processing and distribution in Europe which
brought about different retail prices in different countries. United
Brands bore none of the risks associated with these costs, although
it took them into account as precisely as it could estimate them,
and it appropriated to itself each national retail price so calculated,
less costs and wholesalers' and retailers' traditional profit margins.
It charged all buyers in each country the same price, although
their costs differed, and it refused to discuss or modify its weekly
price, merely allowing buyers to reduce the quantities taken if they
thought its price too high. The Court said that United Brands was
legally free to take these costs and other local factors into consider-
ation only "to a limited extent,"' 113 presumably the extent to which
a competitive seller at United Brands' level would be compelled to
consider them because they would influence the price that buyers
would be prepared to pay. According to the Court, United Brands
was imposing weekly prices artificially calculated by reference to
factors which it did not need to consider, and which it took into ac-
count only for its own advantage, i.e., to obtain for itself every pos-
sible penny of profit likely to be available from the anticipated re-
tail price for the next week although it was not itself selling retail
or even to retailers. United Brands was clearly not compelled to
charge the price it was charging at the level of the market at which
it was charging it. It follows that the nearer to the retail level the
The interplay of supply and demand should, owing to its nature, only be
applied to each stage where it is really manifest.
The mechanisms of the market are adversely affected if the price is cal-
culated by leaving out one stage of the market and taking into account the
law of supply and demand as between the vendor and the ultimate con-
sumer and not as between the vendor (UBC) and the purchaser (the
ripener/distributors).
Id. at paras. 228-33.
113. United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 207, at para.
228, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429.
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dominant enterprise sells, the greater the extent to which local fac-
tors may be taken into account in its final prices.
United Brands seems to be clear authority for the proposition
that price differentiation by a dominant firm is normally unlawful if
it is combined with restrictions on resale by the lower price buyers
to the higher price buyers.114
Substantial price differentiation is facilitated if trade between
purchasers is impossible, as in the case of most services, or imprac-
tical, as in the case of individually designed products and capital
equipment. It is also likely to be unlawful, unless it can be
justified, where transport costs make resale by purchasers uneco-
nomical, and when goods are in short supply and there is no sur-
plus available for resale by purchasers. In all these cases the impo-
sition of different prices on different buyers, except insofar as
based on different costs to the dominant enterprise, may involve
taking unfair advantage of the absence of competition (including
the absence of competition from low price buyers reselling to high
price buyers).
United Brands is also clear authority for the proposition that
differential prices are likely to be unlawful if the prices are
imposed, manipulated or artificially calculated, and that they may
be unlawful, even if neither the highest nor the lowest prices are
"unfair." 1 5 This aspect of the case stresses the exploitative rather
than the competition-distorting effect of the unlawful behavior.
Price differentiation is justified insofar as it is based on differ-
ences in costs paid or borne by the dominant enterprise. Insofar as
the dominant enterprise incurs different production or distribution
costs in different markets, they may be passed on to buyers in
those markets. Genuine economies of scale in bulk deliveries may
be passed on to buyers. More favourable prices may be given to
buyers insofar as they agree to pay identifiable additional costs
which the seller would otherwise have to bear.
Price reductions to break into a new market where the seller
is not dominant are clearly lawful. Reductions to enter a new mar-
ket in which the seller is nevertheless dominant could be unlawful,
114. Id. at para. 232, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
115. The question of how far price differences may be justified is controversial
and complex, because of the wide variety of circumstances which arise. The United
Brands judgment is not very helpful in this respect because the situation in that case
was relatively simple, as well as being somewhat unusual.
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if they were exclusionary and thus "unfair" (Article 86(a)) or if buy-
ers there were in competition with buyers elsewhere and second
line competition were distorted. Local, individual or temporary
price reductions by a dominant enterprise to exclude competition
may be unlawful; there is no reason why a dominant enterprise
should be free to compel some of its customers to subsidise its de-
struction or shackling of a competitor.
Even a dominant enterprise, however, probably is not obliged
to charge the same price, plus local costs, throughout the Commu-
nity. In some regions local supply, lower incomes or different con-
sumer tastes may make it permanently impossible to charge as high
prices as elsewhere, even though the enterprise may still be domi-
nant in the regions in question for the product.
It is not always easy to decide if a dominant firm's low price in
a given region is due to competition or to local tastes and spending
habits; one useful test is what would happen if competitors' prices
there were lowered further, or some other short term factor took
effect.
Price discrimination in favour of an associated company, if it
distorts competition between the associated company and other
buyers of goods or services for which the seller has a dominant po-
sition, can constitute an abuse. 116 This would be so particularly if
the seller was dominant in the market for both a raw material and
the derived product, and was squeezing out independent produc-
ers of the derived product by depriving them of an adequate mar-
gin between the two prices. 117
If the essence of the abuse is interference with second line
competition, how great must be the competitive disadvantage
imposed on buyers for the differentiation to be an abuse? In the
Sugar Cartel case, a loyalty rebate of 0.3% was held sufficient to
cause a competitive disadvantage as between large scale industrial
buyers." 8 The price discrimination in United Brands was consider-
ably greater, frequently amounting to between 10% and 30%. But
116. So pleaded the Commission in National Carbonising v. Commission,
[19751 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1195, 1198; EEC Commission, Fifth Report on Competi-
tion Policy 60-61 (1976). See Temple Lang, supra note 75, at 514.
117. This was the situation as seen by the plaintiff in National Carbonising v.
Commission, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1193, 1195; EEC Commission, Fifth Report
on Competition Policy 60-61 (1976).
118. Sugar Cartel v. Commission, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1663, at paras.
499-528, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. RER. (CCH) 8334.
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in each of these cases the goods sold were raw materials repre-
senting to the buyers in question a very high proportion of the
costs of the finished product, and the discrimination was associated
with anticompetitive measures or effects (on interbrand competi-
tion in Sugar Cartel and on intraband competition in United
Brands).
In United Brands the Court accepted that distributor/ripeners
of bananas in different Member States were actual or potential
competitiors, so that those paying higher prices were under a
"competitive disadvantage" sufficient to make the express words of
Article 86 applicable.
The difficulties of deciding how far and in what circumstances
price differences may be justified in a Community, are greater than
they are in the United States. 119 In addition, it might be unlawful
for a dominant enterprise to charge the same price throughout the
Community if in fact its costs were substantially different in differ-
ent places.
E. Abuse by More Than One Undertaking
of a Dominant Position
Article 86 expressly prohibits any abuse by more than one un-
dertaking of a dominant position. 120 This makes it clear that there
may be a violation of the Treaty by several dominant enterprises in
circumstances to which Article 85 does not apply, i.e., where there
is no collusive or concerted behaviour. Oligopoly is not, of course,
itself unlawful, any more than dominance.
In any market in which a small number of large firms hold
most or all of the market, the firms in question will be acutely
aware of one another's behaviour. The market strategy of each
must take account of the probable reactions of the others, thus
they will tend to act similarly, especially if the other oligopolists'
behaviour can be accurately foreseen. In particular, for example,
each may limit its production so as to charge near-monopoly prices
and maximise its profits.
119. It must be remembered that the European Common Market is much less
homogenous and much more divided by historical and cultural factors (as well as dif-
ferences in national turnover, taxes, etc.) than the United States market. The problem
of adapting price policies to diverse circumstances while keeping within the law is
therefore felt to be greater in Europe than in the United States. In particular, it is
complicated by different currencies having varying exchange rates within the Com-
munity market, and by the fact that several Community member states operate
various kinds of price controls.
120. See note 2 supra.
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Several authors have suggested that Article 86 applies to an
abuse by a small number of enterprises in an oligopolistic market,
even if no one of them has overall dominance, when all behave in
a parallel manner even without any concerted practise between
them.12 1 For example, if all the members of an oligopoly charge
excessive prices for their products, this can occur over a significant
period of time only if there is no significant price competition be-
tween them (and no significant price competition from outside the
oligopoly). Excessive prices and absence of price competition might
coexist with competition between the members of the oligopoly in
other respects (although if competition is vigorous enough it will
usually manifest itself as price competition, in the absence of an
agreement or concerted practise, if profit margins are large). Arti-
cle 86 seems to be applicable both when there is no competition
between oligopolists and when the only competition between
them, for whatever reason, does not have the effect of eliminating
the collective behaviour complained of. In other words, if all the
oligopolists practise the behaviour which is said to be abusive, the
fact that there may be competition between the oligopolists in
other respects is irrelevant.
It will be seen from this analysis that the abuse cannot be to-
tally separated from the question of the existence of the collective
dominant position. Most abuses of dominant power occur because
competition is not sufficient to prevent them. If there is competi-
tion between the members of an oligopoly, this may prevent the
abuse of the members' power (if it is vigorous enough). If it does
not and there is indeed abuse, it will be because the competition
between the oligopolists is not effective or has not related to the
practises which are said to be abuses, i.e., because the oligopolists
have all behaved in the way which is said to be an abuse. In prac-
tise, it seems likely that exploitative abuses against consumers will
normally occur when there is relatively little competition between
the oligopolists, but this would not necessarily be true of exclusion-
ary abuses injuring primarily competitors.
This conclusion, which is valid for both types of abuse, seems
reasonable. If market power is being used in the same way by a
number of enterprises, the fact that the users of it are not a mono-
121. MEGRET, et al., supra note 59, at 73-74. See C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, Su-
pra note 3, at 183; Schroter, Le Concept de Position Dominante dans L'Application
des Articles 66 paragraphs 7 du Trait CEE, in J. VAN DAMME, supra note 3, at 44,
456. See also Re Kellogg Co., 81 F.T.C. 1031 (1972).
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lithic bloc in other respects does not make the market power any
less real or any less liable to abuse.
If it is not necessary that there should be no competition be-
tween several enterprises in order for them to occupy a dominant
position, what are the tests of a collective dominant position? Basi-
cally, the tests of market power are the same whether it is held by
one or more enterprises. The power to behave independently of
outsiders, to exclude competition, to determine prices or to control
a significant proportion of total production or distribution, without
being subject to the influence of competitors, purchasers or suppli-
ers, may be exercised collectively. If dominant power is power
which is great enough to be abused, then collective dominant
power is power which may be abused collectively. It is useful to
ask the question: if those whose market power is in question were
all to act in a certain way, what could happen and who would stop
them?
Clearly one member of an oligopoly may stop them, by acting
differently from the others, e.g., by failing to raise its prices when
the others do, or by cutting its prices when all prices had been the
same. If it does so, it may force its competitors to bring themselves
into line with it. But if this occurs the oligopoly is not behaving, in
the relevant respect, as an oligopoly. What has to be assessed
is the market power of the members when, for any reason, they
act similarly, i.e., their aggregate market power vis-'a-vis non-
members.
Oligopolists may fear competition from one another more than
from smaller companies. Therefore, they all have strong reasons for
avoiding costly forms of competition among themselves, such as
price cutting, of which they cannot limit the cost and of which out-
siders can take advantage. If they sell undifferentiated consumer
products, they typically compete by advertising. It is because
members of an oligopoly selling products have similar interests that
they tend to act similarly (without necessarily having a concerted
practise that they will do so) and that they tend to compete only in
strictly limited ways. Oligopolists often are more anxious to avoid
excessive competition with one another than they are to increase
their market share. They may even fear that if they do not join in a
general price increase, their competitors may have more funds for
advertising and that advertising thus financed will outweigh their
price advantage.
Competition between the oligopolists may cause behaviour
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excluding outsiders. If some members of an oligopoly practise ex-
clusionary behaviour which restricts interbrand competition (total
requirements contracts, tying clauses, fidelity rebates, etc.), the
other members may feel compelled to do the same for fear of being
deprived of too many of their customers. If all members of the oli-
gopoly adopt these practises, the barriers to entry into the industry
will be substantially increased; the market shares of the oligopolists
will become more rigid and competition between the oligopolists
may be reduced.
Clearly, if all the members of an oligopoly adopt the same
practises (such as exclusive distributorship agreements), the effect
on a potential entrant into the market will be similar to that of
an equal number of exclusive distribution agreements entered into
by a single enterprise with the same market share as all the
oligopolists in the aggregate. The effect may not be identical, how-
ever; a distributor whose agreement had expired might consider
himself unable to do business without the products of a single
dominant enterprise, but might be more willing to do business
with a new entrant if, in any case, he was able to stock the products
of only one of several oligopolists at a time. Insofar as the effects of
the oligopolists' practises on an outsider are concerned, therefore,
the extent or the nature of competition between the oligo-
polists may be irrelevant if they all practise exclusionary behaviour
which makes it impossible or difficult for him to enter the market.
In other words, if all the oligopolists practise the exclusionary be-
haviour in question, the fact that there may be competition be-
tween the oligopolists in other respects is irrelevant. But, in some
industries, it may be more important to maintain competition as far
as possible between the oligopolists rather than seeking to protect
the possibility of further entry, and exclusionary vertical practises
might assist competition between the oligopolists.
On this analysis, even the smallest member of an oligopoly
may be bound by the duties of dominant enterprises under Article
86, even though considered alone it is clearly not dominant. The
smallest member of an oligopoly may plead that it is compelled to
imitate the practises of the larger oligopolists, but if these are
abuses, even a company with a small market share (if indeed it
should be regarded as a member of an oligopoly at all) must not
commit them. The gravity of its offense might well be less than
that of the market leader, of course, and the Commission would
hardly attack a small oligopolist without previously or simultane-
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ously attacking all the larger ones. This would mean, for example,
that even the smallest oligopolist may not indulge in exclusionary
pricing to eliminate a smaller non-oligopolist competitor from the
market. 122
III. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES AND COMMENTS
Several specific conclusions can be drawn. First, the contrast
drawn by various authors between EEC law which prohibits abuse
of a dominant position and United States law which forbids "mo-
nopolisation" is exaggerated and inaccurate. EEC law also prohibits
monopolising by "dominant" enterprises. This seems to be a case
of what biologists call convergent evolution.
Second, all the United States case law on monopolising and at-
tempts to monopolise under section 2 of the Sherman Act is rele-
vant to EEC law, as well as the case law under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and under the Clayton Act. This does not mean that
the United States case law will necessarily be followed by the
Court of Justice or by the Commission, but merely that it becomes
necessary to look at it.
Third, the valuable economic analyses of United States anti-
trust cases and policies is directly relevant and valuable in consid-
ering Community antitrust policy and experience, and this should
encourage more comparative and economic analysis of European
Community antitrust law.
Fourth, if "monopolising" by a dominant enterprise is prohib-
ited by Article 86, complaints against such behaviour will be en-
couraged.
In the longer term, problems will arise in deciding what reme-
dies are appropriate when an enterprise is found to have substan-
tially strengthened an already dominant position by practises pro-
hibited by Article 86. It might be insufficient, in a serious case,
merely to fine the enterprise and to order it to stop the practises in
question, thus allowing it to continue to enjoy the market power it
had unlawfully obtained; in a very serious case, divestiture might
be appropriate. It is clear that if a dominant enterprise has carried
out an illegal merger, divestiture will be ordered. But the appro-
priate remedy is more difficult where the violation has been a
continuing practise and the improper increase in market power has
122. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to
the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 373 (1974).
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come about gradually. This problem already arises, of course, un-
der those of the examples of abuses given in Article 86 which
clearly restrict competition as well as or instead of constituting ex-
ploitative abuses. Fortunately, the Commission has a very wide
power to order whatever remedy may be appropriate. The Court
has held that the Commission's power to order the infringement
brought to an end "must be applied in relation to the infringement
which has been established and may include an order to do certain
acts or provide certain advantages which have been wrongfully
withheld, as well as prohibiting the continuation of certain actions,
practises or situations.' 123 In that case (an unlawful refusal to sup-
ply) the Court went on to hold that the Commission had been cor-
rect in ordering deliveries of specified minimum quantities and or-
dering the corporation to make long term proposals to prevent
repetition of the unlawful conduct.
The latter holding approves a useful device; in a decision rul-
ing that an abuse has been committed, the Commission orders the
firms to submit a plan for ensuring that it will not recur.124 This, of
course, may not avoid the necessity of ultimately imposing a rem-
edy on the firm, by a second decision, if nothing equivalent to a
consent decree on the remedy can be reached. But it offers the ad-
vantage that the remedy can be worked out by an administrative
authority equipped to investigate the industry and to hold hearings
(e.g., of economists, competitiors and consumers) subject, of course,
to review by the Court of any decision ultimately imposing a rem-
edy. This is probably more satisfactory than the United States prac-
tise of having the Court itself settle the remedy in a civil action. In
particular, it is certainly much more convenient for the Commis-
sion to supervise the implementation of a complex remedy decision
by a dominant firm than it would be for a court in the United
States. Subject to this, United States experience with antitrust rem-
edies will be useful in Europe in the future. For example, dives-
123. Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [19741 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, at
255, paras. 45-46, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8209. See the
opinion of the Advocate General in United Brands v. Commission, [1978] C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 207, 342, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429. In Article 85 cases, the Commission has often considered it necessary to forbid
a variety of practises rather wider than that found to have been committed. This is
obviously necessary to prevent companies later adopting similar but not identical
practises, or practises with similar economic effects. The same type of formulation
might be necessary in cases under Article 86 where the abuse condemned was capa-
ble of being practised in a variety of different ways.
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titure and complusory licensing of patents will certainly be consid-
ered as remedies in appropriate cases.
Since Article 86 prohibits both exploitation of a dominant posi-
tion and behaviour which reduces competition, there are argu-
ments which suggest that the Commission should try to direct its
enforcement activities against anticompetitive behaviour rather
than exploitation. 125 It is unlikely that the Commission, with its
very limited manpower, could punish even a large proportion of
the examples of illegal exploitation which may occur, especially
since exploitation cases are likely to be even more complex and dif-
ficult than cases of anticompetitive abuses. Greater market power
increases the scope for illegal exploitation and some, perhaps
much, exploitation could probably be prevented by discouraging
improper means of enlarging market power. Also, once improperly
acquired, it is difficult to reduce market power or to recreate com-
petition by administrative measures. Another consideration is that
insofar as anticompetitive behaviour is directed against a particular
victim company (as in the ECSC contested merger case, Commer-
cial Solvents, ABG-BP, United Brands-Olesen, Hugin and National
Carbonising, all cases of behaviour with specially serious effects on
individual companies), the companies concerned should be able to
protect themselves by civil actions in national courts for compensa-
tion or injunctions, although it is not yet completely clear how far
the national laws of the nine Member States make this possible. 126
In cases where behaviour specially prejudicing an individual
company is clearly illegal, it might be appropriate for the Commis-
sion to claim and exercise power to grant interim measures of pro-
tection. The Commission clearly has these powers under the ECSC
Treaty, 127 and if the Commission indeed has similar powers under
the EEC Treaty, the dominant enterprises concerned might not
124. Re Continental Can, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L7) 25 (1972), [1970-1972
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9581; Re Commercial Solvents, 15 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L299) 51 (1972), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9543; Re Hugin-Liptons, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L22) 23 (1978),
[1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,007.
125. See Monopolkommission, Sondergutachten 1: Anwendung und Moglich-
keiten der Missbrauchsaufsicht iber Marktbeherrschende Unternehmen seit Inkraft-
treten der Kartellgesetznovelle (1975).
126. See La rbpartition des consbquences dommageables d'une violation des ar-
ticles 85 et 86 due Trait instituant la CEE (EEC Commission, Sbrie concurrence,
1966); Temple Lang, supra note 75, at 474-82.
127. National Carbonising v. Commission, [1975] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1193;
EEC Commission, Fifth Report on Competition Policy 60-61 (1976).
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always think it worthwhile to try to insist on obtaining a definitive
decision. (The disputes between Commercial Solvents and Zoja and
between United Brands and Olesen, for example, were settled
after the Commission's procedure had begun but before the cases
were finally dealt with by the Court of Justice.) If this were so, the
Commission might be able to give its attention primarily to cases
brought, for example, to protect consumers or the public interest
in continued competition. The Commission also has power to pro-
pose a directive harmonising the national law remedies of firms in-
jured by violations of Community antitrust law, but has not yet
done so.
There is another advantage in the Commission concentrating
on "monopolising practices" rather than "exploitation" of market
power. It is not an impossible task for an administrative body and a
Court to determine whether or not a particular practise interferes
with intrabrand or interbrand competition. It is often a very diffi-
cult task to determine whether a given level of prices is excessive
and "unfair;" such questions involve considerations of ethics and of
economic policy rather than readily justifiable issues, and this diffi-
culty is not fully overcome by having cases determined initially by
an administrative body and reviewed by the Court of Justice.
Notwithstanding, the Article 86 prohibition on unfair and ex-
cessive prices must not and will not be made a dead letter. In the
United States the court will not determine the reasonableness of
prices, but in the United States monopoly power, not merely its
abuse, may be unlawful. In the EEC, monopoly power is clearly
lawful, and therefore the need to prevent its exploitation is greater
than in the United States. The Commission could not abandon its
duty to enforce Article 86 against exploitative abuses, even if it
wished to do so.
Any corporation which has complained to the Commission
about an alleged violation of Community antitrust rules may sue
the Commission if its complaint is not satisfied. This seems to be
the result of Metro-Grossmarkte v. Commission, 128 which implies
that the Commission has a legal duty to deal in some way with ev-
ery complaint of an antitrust violation made to it, and is not free to
choose to deal only with major cases, leaving the complainant to its
128. [1977] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; Temple Lang, The Position of Third Parties in EEC Com-
petition Cases, 3 EUR. L. REV. 177 (1978).
1979-1980]
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM
remedies in the national courts. This question is unresolved, not
least because the extent and nature of the remedies available be-
fore national courts have been virtually unexplored.
Threats by a dominant enterprise to use industrial or commer-
cial property rights to divide up the Common Market, in circum-
stances where this is clearly contrary to Articles 30 and 36 of the
EEC Treaty, could also be a violation of Article 86. If this occurred,
the enterprise involved might be liable to fines and to civil actions
for compensation, neither of which is possible under Articles 30
and 36.
In any case, it is clear that enterprises which are increasing
their market power, and are at or near the threshold of dominance,
need to review their market position and market behaviour more
widely and more carefully than hitherto.
If Article 86 prohibits all behaviour, whatever its nature,
which has sufficiently substantial effects on competition (at least
when no strong justification can be shown), otherwise lawful prac-
tises that unnecessarily exclude competition are unlawful. To deter-
mine whether any given behaviour violates Article 86, its effects
and not merely its nature must be looked at. This is nothing new
for United States corporations accustomed to avoiding what might
seem to be "monopolising." Taken together with the United
Brands decision on what constitutes a dominant position, this in-
volves a very significant increase in the practical importance of Ar-
ticle 86 for many corporations and necessitates a major widening of
the antitrust compliance programmes of companies in Europe.
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